A terrific, incisive, scathing commentary on life in surveillance in China, a must-read for all those of us who have normalised the idea of state-sponsored surveillance through dramas (and in real life, including in my part of the world). This article bears particular relevance because it is written by a (now outcast) constitutional scholar in the country, a former law professor at Tsinghua University. I also highly recommend his other essays, available in translation, linked in the brief bio at the top of this article: http://chinaheritage.net/journal/cyclopes-on-my-doorstep-by-xu-zhangrun/
I think China is interesting for a lot of reasons. Even just 15 years ago, it was commonplace for people to talk about how economic growth and prosperity would inevitably — as if by some natural law akin to gravity — lead to democratization and liberalization in China. These days, it increasingly looks like China is disturbing some assumptions that have become widespread and almost reflexive among people in my part of the world. What if economic development is not systematically related with the promotion of civil liberties and other human rights? What if a repressive government could better promote the prosperity of a nation? What would people choose then? I think that’s the question China poses in this century. (It’s worth noting that, although people in China navigate panopticon-like surveillance, must be assiduously avoid political controversy, etc., I think the average person living in a place like Beijin or Shenzhen is probably pretty happy with his or her life.)
Fantastic insights as ever, Maq! I agree with everything you said. And this is precisely the Great China Experiment, right? Everyone else who tried to set up non-democratic systems has failed. It’s almost as though the Chinese want to defiantly prove that it is not impossible to succeed with this. I sense an egotistic streak (or a streak of pride, if you prefer) there too.
I also agree that the average person in China is probably happy and satisfied, and the dissent is coming from very few corners, and obviously not loud or powerful enough. What will truly be interesting though, is what happens after the Xi era ends (especially since serious contenders like Bo Xilai etc – well entrenched within the system – have been silenced a while ago). Does the CCP have its alternatives in place? Or is there a Plan B for a leaderless China? (The same question holds for Putin’s Russia too, btw – being an equally intriguing political experiment).
Personally, I think systemic stability is still not truly guaranteed, precisely because it is so heavily dependent on the individual who is at the top. (If the CCP appeared to have a system of ensuring that the leadership chain remains healthy and unbroken, I would have made a different argument.) So even though there’s a (temporary) semblance of peace and permanence, collapse remains both possible and probable.
Thanks for this link @pickledragon. What a powerful essay written so eloquently. But it was the photo of the cameras at the bottom of the page that really threw me. wow.
Of course, the outposts are a different story – the Uighurs, the Tibetans (the latter hitting much closer home for us), Hong Kong, Taiwan… Mainland Chinese appear ensconced in their happy bubble.
I wonder about this, too. There are some people who think the CCP is deeply divided and/or unstable (Yascha Mounk recently had somebody on his podcast who has been a commentator on China for a very long time and who thinks China’s amazing economic and social achievements in conceal a rotting set of political institutions). Surely you’re right that Chinese system’s dependence on powerful leaders creates institutional risks. I know of at least two. The first is what Francis Fukuyama calls “the bad emperor problem”. In a system with fairly sweeping and centralized power in a single figure or institution and in which there is very little in the way of formal checks and balances, there is tremendous upside because there is little institutional restraint hindering beneficial government action (my favourite example of this is high-speed rail: California started the process of building HSR in 1996 and the first phase of construction is expected in 2033, whereas China started building in 2007 and already has an extensive HSR network which is – according to Wikipedia – the most extensive in the world), but the downside is also huge because bad leadership can do what it wants to do without there being a bulwark to protect against abuse. The second problem is compounded by the first and is the one you astutely note, namely the difficulties inherent in securing a peaceful and stable transition between leaders. On the one hand, the need to have a clear line of succession and a crop of good forthcoming leaders is essential precisely because of the so-called “bad emperor problem”. On the other hand, existence of competent leaders who have the necessary legitimacy to smoothly come into power when its their “turn” are a threat to any incumbent leader. It’s not surprising that, historically, similar systems of government suffered immensely when there were transitions. (Muslim Mongol rulers, who had fairly absolutist systems of government, used to routinely have civil wars after one khan would die in order to determine who would succeed the now dead khan; it severely weakened those khanates and often resulted in those Mongol khanates splintering. Similarly, the Ottoman sultans came up with the rather horrific institution known as the “Kafes” or, in English, “the Cage”: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kafes.)
That was very interesting. I didn’t know of the term Kafes, but the history of the Mughal empire is similar, I think. And I would imagine most imperial successions in many parts of the world (certainly in South Asia) were determined this way. That said, merely because leadership transitions have been violent historically does not justify instability in contemporary times. It surprises me as to how and why the rest of the politburo is fine with the present arrangement and whatever impending chaos is to inevitably follow.
As a follow up to the original link, I read this – slightly older but still relevant – excellent essay by the same commentator, which I thought was a great lesson in modern Chinese politics (as the non-communist world understands it, but from a Chinese perspective) with appropriate historical context. You might appreciate it as well: http://chinaheritage.net/journal/imminent-fears-immediate-hopes-a-beijing-jeremiad/
I’ve never formally studied political science or history (the latter as a minor at university only and I was always very poor at it), so my own analyses are usually very elementary and unsophisticated. So your inserts on all this are really fascinating and more importantly, thought-provoking. Thank you! 😊 🙏
Thanks for the link! I’ll have a look at this essay on the weekend (drowning in legal files T_T).
I haven’t studied political science or history formally either, although as teenager I was dead-set on becoming a historian or a high school history teacher. I still have an interest in a lot of this stuff, although I find a lot of history is written as a parade of events without any attempt to explain anything. In fact, in university, I took a course in history once where I got the distinct impression from other history majors and from the professor that the modern study of history is resolutely opposed to abstract in favour of concrete particulars and eschews explanation in favour of hand-wavey claims about contingency, accident, etc. (Not that contingency or accident have no role in the study of human affairs. But it’s a bit of a cop-out when your account of a complex event like a war basically amounts to an account of what happened without any attempt to say why it happened, accepting as always that the study of history, politics, etc. is an inexact science and unlikely to produce the kind of certain, bulletproof explanations you get from harder science.)
True re Mughals! I use the historical examples merely as an example of the underlying mechanism which I believe creates the risk of instability and how that risk has manifested in the past. There’s no guarantee that a transition will be unstable or violent, although the risk is certainly there and may materialize (though one hopes it doesn’t).
0
0
Modal title
Modal title
Modal title
Modal title
A verification email has been sent to your new email address.
Please click the link in that email to complete the email change process.
Modal title
Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetuer adipiscing elit,
sed diam nonummy nibh euismod tincidunt ut laoreet dolore magna
pickleddragon
December 21, 2020 at 8:01 PM
A terrific, incisive, scathing commentary on life in surveillance in China, a must-read for all those of us who have normalised the idea of state-sponsored surveillance through dramas (and in real life, including in my part of the world). This article bears particular relevance because it is written by a (now outcast) constitutional scholar in the country, a former law professor at Tsinghua University. I also highly recommend his other essays, available in translation, linked in the brief bio at the top of this article: http://chinaheritage.net/journal/cyclopes-on-my-doorstep-by-xu-zhangrun/
Maq
December 21, 2020 at 8:27 PM
A haunting essay. Thanks for sharing!
I think China is interesting for a lot of reasons. Even just 15 years ago, it was commonplace for people to talk about how economic growth and prosperity would inevitably — as if by some natural law akin to gravity — lead to democratization and liberalization in China. These days, it increasingly looks like China is disturbing some assumptions that have become widespread and almost reflexive among people in my part of the world. What if economic development is not systematically related with the promotion of civil liberties and other human rights? What if a repressive government could better promote the prosperity of a nation? What would people choose then? I think that’s the question China poses in this century. (It’s worth noting that, although people in China navigate panopticon-like surveillance, must be assiduously avoid political controversy, etc., I think the average person living in a place like Beijin or Shenzhen is probably pretty happy with his or her life.)
pickleddragon
December 21, 2020 at 9:28 PM
Fantastic insights as ever, Maq! I agree with everything you said. And this is precisely the Great China Experiment, right? Everyone else who tried to set up non-democratic systems has failed. It’s almost as though the Chinese want to defiantly prove that it is not impossible to succeed with this. I sense an egotistic streak (or a streak of pride, if you prefer) there too.
I also agree that the average person in China is probably happy and satisfied, and the dissent is coming from very few corners, and obviously not loud or powerful enough. What will truly be interesting though, is what happens after the Xi era ends (especially since serious contenders like Bo Xilai etc – well entrenched within the system – have been silenced a while ago). Does the CCP have its alternatives in place? Or is there a Plan B for a leaderless China? (The same question holds for Putin’s Russia too, btw – being an equally intriguing political experiment).
Personally, I think systemic stability is still not truly guaranteed, precisely because it is so heavily dependent on the individual who is at the top. (If the CCP appeared to have a system of ensuring that the leadership chain remains healthy and unbroken, I would have made a different argument.) So even though there’s a (temporary) semblance of peace and permanence, collapse remains both possible and probable.
stpauligurl
December 22, 2020 at 5:08 AM
Thanks for this link @pickledragon. What a powerful essay written so eloquently. But it was the photo of the cameras at the bottom of the page that really threw me. wow.
“I also agree that the average person in China is probably happy and satisfied, and the dissent is coming from very few corners, and obviously not loud or powerful enough”
unless you happen to be a Uighur…
https://www.vox.com/2020/7/28/21333345/uighurs-china-internment-camps-forced-labor-xinjiang
pickleddragon
December 22, 2020 at 6:22 AM
Of course, the outposts are a different story – the Uighurs, the Tibetans (the latter hitting much closer home for us), Hong Kong, Taiwan… Mainland Chinese appear ensconced in their happy bubble.
Maq
December 22, 2020 at 5:09 PM
I wonder about this, too. There are some people who think the CCP is deeply divided and/or unstable (Yascha Mounk recently had somebody on his podcast who has been a commentator on China for a very long time and who thinks China’s amazing economic and social achievements in conceal a rotting set of political institutions). Surely you’re right that Chinese system’s dependence on powerful leaders creates institutional risks. I know of at least two. The first is what Francis Fukuyama calls “the bad emperor problem”. In a system with fairly sweeping and centralized power in a single figure or institution and in which there is very little in the way of formal checks and balances, there is tremendous upside because there is little institutional restraint hindering beneficial government action (my favourite example of this is high-speed rail: California started the process of building HSR in 1996 and the first phase of construction is expected in 2033, whereas China started building in 2007 and already has an extensive HSR network which is – according to Wikipedia – the most extensive in the world), but the downside is also huge because bad leadership can do what it wants to do without there being a bulwark to protect against abuse. The second problem is compounded by the first and is the one you astutely note, namely the difficulties inherent in securing a peaceful and stable transition between leaders. On the one hand, the need to have a clear line of succession and a crop of good forthcoming leaders is essential precisely because of the so-called “bad emperor problem”. On the other hand, existence of competent leaders who have the necessary legitimacy to smoothly come into power when its their “turn” are a threat to any incumbent leader. It’s not surprising that, historically, similar systems of government suffered immensely when there were transitions. (Muslim Mongol rulers, who had fairly absolutist systems of government, used to routinely have civil wars after one khan would die in order to determine who would succeed the now dead khan; it severely weakened those khanates and often resulted in those Mongol khanates splintering. Similarly, the Ottoman sultans came up with the rather horrific institution known as the “Kafes” or, in English, “the Cage”: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kafes.)
pickleddragon
December 22, 2020 at 8:50 PM
That was very interesting. I didn’t know of the term Kafes, but the history of the Mughal empire is similar, I think. And I would imagine most imperial successions in many parts of the world (certainly in South Asia) were determined this way. That said, merely because leadership transitions have been violent historically does not justify instability in contemporary times. It surprises me as to how and why the rest of the politburo is fine with the present arrangement and whatever impending chaos is to inevitably follow.
As a follow up to the original link, I read this – slightly older but still relevant – excellent essay by the same commentator, which I thought was a great lesson in modern Chinese politics (as the non-communist world understands it, but from a Chinese perspective) with appropriate historical context. You might appreciate it as well: http://chinaheritage.net/journal/imminent-fears-immediate-hopes-a-beijing-jeremiad/
I’ve never formally studied political science or history (the latter as a minor at university only and I was always very poor at it), so my own analyses are usually very elementary and unsophisticated. So your inserts on all this are really fascinating and more importantly, thought-provoking. Thank you! 😊 🙏
Maq
December 22, 2020 at 9:01 PM
Thanks for the link! I’ll have a look at this essay on the weekend (drowning in legal files T_T).
I haven’t studied political science or history formally either, although as teenager I was dead-set on becoming a historian or a high school history teacher. I still have an interest in a lot of this stuff, although I find a lot of history is written as a parade of events without any attempt to explain anything. In fact, in university, I took a course in history once where I got the distinct impression from other history majors and from the professor that the modern study of history is resolutely opposed to abstract in favour of concrete particulars and eschews explanation in favour of hand-wavey claims about contingency, accident, etc. (Not that contingency or accident have no role in the study of human affairs. But it’s a bit of a cop-out when your account of a complex event like a war basically amounts to an account of what happened without any attempt to say why it happened, accepting as always that the study of history, politics, etc. is an inexact science and unlikely to produce the kind of certain, bulletproof explanations you get from harder science.)
True re Mughals! I use the historical examples merely as an example of the underlying mechanism which I believe creates the risk of instability and how that risk has manifested in the past. There’s no guarantee that a transition will be unstable or violent, although the risk is certainly there and may materialize (though one hopes it doesn’t).